I conducted a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to determine possible security and privacy issues.

I have actually written about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on static analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive evidence that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, especially given the growing concerns around information personal privacy, surveillance, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between worldwide powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app the other day too.

• Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation techniques exist, with indications that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public keys, instead of depending on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking records detailed user behavior without clear authorization. - WebView control is present, which might allow for the app to gain access to private external browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial portion of the examined code appears to concentrate on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous unique gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
• System properties, set up bundles, and root detection mechanisms suggest prospective anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android gadgets.
• Geolocation and network profiling exist, suggesting prospective tracking abilities and enabling or disabling of fingerprinting programs by region.
• Hardcoded gadget design lists suggest the application might behave differently depending upon the found hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract additional device details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through basic Android SIM lookup (because authorization was not given), it attempts maker particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, numerous observed habits line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could assist in unapproved screen capture or .
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unidentified functions.
• The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible surveillance mechanisms.
• The app carries out calls to load Dex modules, where extra code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This center is not typically inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be executed in native code, wiki.die-karte-bitte.de such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete level of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate benefits, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a legitimate email, which need to already provide adequate authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to aggressively gather and send special device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system homes.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds normal analytics practices, possibly enabling relentless user tracking and re-identification across devices. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation strategies and network communication with third-party tracking services, require a higher level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code packing along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app might enable the implementation and execution of unreviewed, remotely delivered code. This is a serious possible attack vector. No proof in this report is presented that from another location deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's approach to discovering rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content defense are critical, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such strict procedures in an application of this nature, raising further questions about its intent.
  
  Users and companies considering installing DeepSeek should be aware of these prospective risks. If this application is being utilized within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be enforced before allowing its implementation on managed gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on static code review and does not imply that all detected functions are actively utilized. Further examination is required for conclusive conclusions.