I carried out a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to determine possible security and privacy issues.

I've blogged about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants scrutiny, particularly given the growing issues around information personal privacy, security, the potential misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between international powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app the other day also. - Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation methods are present, with indications that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of depending on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking user habits without clear consent. - WebView adjustment exists, which might permit the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A significant part of the analyzed code appears to focus on event device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers numerous distinct gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System properties, set up bundles, and root detection mechanisms recommend possible anti-tampering procedures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy advocates and security scientists utilize to root their Android gadgets.
• Geolocation and network profiling exist, suggesting prospective tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting programs by region. - Hardcoded gadget design lists recommend the application might behave differently depending upon the found hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the device through basic Android SIM lookup (due to the fact that consent was not given), it attempts manufacturer particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, a number of observed behaviors line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and library.kemu.ac.ke UI overlays, which could assist in unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, forum.batman.gainedge.org serial numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible security mechanisms.
• The app carries out calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves turn around and make extra calls to dlopen(), wifidb.science which can be used to fill additional.so files. This center is not generally examined by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be executed in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and obscures the complete extent of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly escalate benefits, library.kemu.ac.ke possibly making use of vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for fakenews.win debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial personal privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which should already offer sufficient authentication. There is no legitimate reason for the app to aggressively collect and send distinct device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system homes.
  
  The level of tracking observed here goes beyond normal analytics practices, potentially enabling relentless user tracking and re-identification across devices. These habits, combined with obfuscation techniques and network communication with third-party tracking services, necessitate a greater level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code filling as well as the bundling of native code recommends that the app could allow the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location delivered code. This is a severe potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that from another location deployed code execution is being done, valetinowiki.racing just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's technique to spotting rooted devices appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content security are critical, or passfun.awardspace.us in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such strict measures in an application of this nature, raising additional concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations considering setting up DeepSeek should be mindful of these potential threats. If this application is being utilized within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls ought to be enforced before permitting its release on handled gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on fixed code evaluation and does not imply that all discovered functions are actively utilized. Further examination is needed for conclusive conclusions.